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Naturalism, Theism, and the Risks of Professional Values
Imposition in Psychotherapy with Theistic Clients
Jeffrey S. Reber
University of West Georgia

The codes of ethics guiding the work of counselors and psychotherapists state that ethical practitioners
pursue training in areas where they are at risk of imposing values. While training in the potential imposition of personal values is pervasive, training in the potential imposition of professional values is rare.
Naturalism, the guiding worldview of science and psychology excludes theism, which is the guiding worldview of many people. Consequently, naturalism is a professional value that may be imposed on theistic
clients in psychotherapy. The exclusion of theism from psychology and psychotherapy along with the
naturalization of theistic experiences and concepts and the omission of theism from theistic theories that
are imported into psychotherapy demonstrate how great the risk of imposing the professional value of
naturalism in psychotherapy is. In light of that risk and given the lack of training in this area of need,
several forms of theism that fall on a continuum from weak to strong theism are briefly reviewed as an
initial step in educating counselors and psychotherapists about this important aspect of many clients.
Also, to encourage careful and critical reflection, some of the challenges that accompany the common
ways in which counselors and psychotherapists might include theism in their therapy is provided. Specific points of emphasis for therapists who are members of the church and work with theistic clients who
are members of the church are addressed in the conclusion.

T

he American Counseling Association Code of
Ethics (2014) states that ethical counselors and
psychotherapists, “seek training in areas in which they
are at risk of imposing their values onto clients, especially when the counselor’s values are inconsistent
with the client’s goals or are discriminatory in nature”
(section A.4.b.; see APA, 2017, Principle E, for a similar statement). Generally speaking, counselor values
come in two forms: personal values and professional
values (Packard, 2009). Personal values typically stem
from the therapist’s upbringing, culture, and personal
experiences and can include things like religious beliefs, political leanings, and gender role expectations.

Professional values stem from the disciplines and
institutions within which the therapist has been
educated and trained and can include things like
ontological assumptions (e.g., individualism), epistemological preferences (e.g., empiricism), and ethical positions (e.g., utilitarianism). In both cases, the
values may be explicitly adopted, but they can also
just as often be implicitly held ( Jackson, Hansen, &
Cook-Ly, 2013).
Training in the risk of personal value imposition in
domains such as race, ethnicity, culture, gender and
gender identity, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic
status, religion, and ability is abundantly available,
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both in degree programs in which counselors and
psychotherapists are initially trained and in continuing education classes that are offered across the country and at annual conventions of the ACA and APA.
Training in the risk of professional value imposition
is scarcer, in part because values stemming from the
counselor’s or psychotherapist’s discipline and institution are often hidden (Slife, Reber, & Richardson,
2005). Consequently, professional values receive less
attention in the literature and in training and education than personal values. Nevertheless, professional
values constitute an important area in which the risk
of value imposition exists. Increasingly, psychologists
have uncovered forms of institutional and disciplinary bias in course and degree program curricula and
materials (e.g., Peterson & Kroner, 2006), research
studies (e.g., Roberts, Bareket-Shavit, Dollins, Goldie,
& Mortenson, 2020), graduate education (Diggles,
2014), and more. Indigenous psychologists also point
to cultural biases in psychology’s professional values
concerning research design, instrumentation, and
analysis, including within the scientific method itself
(e.g., Sundararajan, 2019).
Is it possible that counselors and psychotherapists,
given the training and education they have received in
psychological theory, method, and practice, may be at
risk of imposing professional values on their clients?
An increasing number of psychotherapists believe it
is possible and call for increased training and education for counselors and psychotherapists to address
this ethical concern (Slife, 2011; Tjeltveit, 2004). One
professional value central to psychological science and
practice, and which has been critically examined as
to its risk of biasing the discipline and institution of
psychology in a number of significant ways, is naturalism (Armstrong, 2011; Slife & Reber, 2009; Bishop,
2007). This paper extends that critical examination to
include counselors and psychotherapists, who might
be at risk of imposing the professional value of naturalism on their clients, especially clients of faith. The
professional value of naturalism will be described, its
impact and imposition within the discipline of psychology will be reviewed, and the extension of those
same forms of imposition to counseling and psychotherapy will be explicated. Then, given that ethical
counselors and psychotherapists “seek training in areas
in which they are at risk of imposing their values onto

clients” (ACA, 2014, Sect. A.4.b), some preliminary
education and training in the theistic worldview that
is held by many clients of faith will be provided.
The Professional Value of Naturalism

The worldview of naturalism, which the historian of
psychology, Thomas Leahey (2013) describes as “the
central dogma of science” (p. 379) has been adopted
by the discipline of psychology and by the institution of science (Plantinga, 2011). Naturalism is the
idea that all events are explainable in terms of natural
laws and processes. Naturalism has been historically
divided into two components or aspects: ontological
and methodological (Bishop, 2007). In its ontological form, naturalism is concerned with the question
of what is real. For the ontological naturalist, the real
is what is material, tangible, and operates according
to natural laws. What is not real, for the ontological
naturalist, is all that lies outside of this definition of
the natural, or what is often referred to as the supernatural. Regarding the supernatural and ontological
naturalism’s treatment of it, Decaro and MacArthur
(2010) state that ontological naturalism cannot “countenance the supernatural, whether in the form of entities (such as God, spirits, entelechies, or Cartesian
minds), events (such as miracles or magic), or epistemic faculties (such as mystical insight or spiritual
intuition” (p. 3). For the ontological naturalist, such
things simply are not considered to be real and therefore have no place in scientific explanation.
Recognizing the potential for value imposition
in such a strong ontological position, a number of
scientists and psychologists endorse instead the
methodological or scientific form of naturalism.
Methodological or scientific naturalism claims not to
weigh in on the reality of things, like those just described, but instead confines itself only “to the search
for natural causes to explain natural phenomena”
( Jones, 2005, sect. 4, para. 2). The methodological
naturalist believes that the scientific method is the best
way to investigate reality and can be applied without
weighing in on what that reality is (Bishop, 2007).
Thus, methodological naturalists do not explicitly
deny non- or super-natural realities, but only exclude
explanations invoking such realities from their study.
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As Jones (2005) put it most frankly, “while supernatural explanations may be important and have merit,
they are not part of science” (sect. 4, para. 2).
A number of philosophers of science have strongly
argued that this methodological approach, in which
God and “supernatural” things are bracketed rather
than ontologically denied, creates a slippery slope in
which methodological naturalism inevitably slides
into ontological naturalism (e.g., Gantt & Williams,
2020; Zargar, Azadegan, & Nabavi, 2019). Schafersman (1997), for example, has examined the slipperiness of the slope on which these two forms of
naturalism are located and concludes that “the practice or adoption of methodological naturalism entails
a logical and moral belief in ontological naturalism,
so they are not logically decoupled” (sect. Methodological and Ontological Naturalism, para. 11). In
a similar vein, Forrest (2000) notes that whether its
practitioners intend for it to do so or not:

Despite this resolution and methodological naturalism’s ostensible neutrality with regard to the
ontological claims of religion, only a few years after it
was published, one of the best known psychologists
in the United States, a specialist on prejudice, bias,
and morality, Jonathan Haidt, gave a presentation
to a group of scientists titled, Enlightenment 2.0 Requires Morality 2.0, in which he began his talk with
the following items on a PowerPoint slide: “Broad
scientific consensus: 1) A world with gods should be
measurably different. 2) We can’t be certain that no
supernatural entities exist, but . . . 3) Our world does
not look like a world with gods. 4) Historical, cosmological, & causal claims of religions mostly false. 5) Religion is a natural phenomenon; it can and should be
studied with methods of science.” After Haidt quickly
reviewed the items on the list, none with a single citation or shred of evidence offered as support, he summarized his argument by stating that “the factual
claims of religion are by and large, if not altogether,
false.” He then asked for agreement with his argument
and seeing what appeared to be all the hands in the
audience go up, he moved on with his talk, noting
that anyone who did disagree with any item on the list
could see him afterward at lunch, ostensibly to be put
straight on their error.
Were this the only example of this slippery slope
in psychology, it would not be worth mentioning, but
a systematic review of the most popular psychology
research methods texts used to teach psychologists
how to conduct their studies shows that the slip from
methodological to metaphysical naturalism is common, though rarely acknowledged (Reber, 2018).
Thus, psychological naturalism, which states that human behavior and mental states “must be explained in
terms that are compatible with the broader physicalistic view of nature provided by the natural sciences”
(Stich, 1992, p. 246; also Fils, 2019), inevitably slips
into a metaphysical/ontological naturalism that arbitrates matters of faith and theology and results in
an pervasive implicit bias in the discipline (see Gantt,
2018; Gantt & Williams, 2020; Slife & Reber, 2009).

methodological naturalism has consistently chipped
away at the plausibility of the existential claims made
by supernaturalism by providing increasingly successful explanations of aspects of the world which religion
has historically sought to explain, e.g., human origins.
The threat faced by supernaturalism is not the threat
of logical disproof, but the fact of having its explanations supplanted by scientific ones” (sect. Philosophical Naturalism’s Ontological Categories, para. 7).

Whether in its metaphysical or methodological
form, then, naturalism has inescapable implications
for the viability of any non-naturalistic worldviews.
An illustration of this slippery slope in action may
be useful at this juncture. In 2007, the American Psychological Association Council of Representatives
issued a Resolution on Religious, Religion-Based and/
or Religion-Derived Prejudice. In that resolution the
council makes a statement that is consistent with psychology’s methodological naturalism, which is that
“psychology has no legitimate function in arbitrating
matters of faith and theology” (para. 5). Thus, with
regard to the truth claims of religions, including theistic religions, psychology is to exclude such ontological
matters from its science and not judge their veracity.
Such things, on this methodological naturalistic account, simply lie outside the purview of the discipline
of scientific psychology.

Psychology’s Imposition of Naturalism

Theism, like naturalism, is a worldview. Indeed, it
is considered the other major worldview of Western
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civilization (Smith, 2001). Unlike naturalism, theism
assumes “that a God (or Gods) is actively and currently
engaged with and makes a meaningful difference in
the practical world” (Reber & Slife, 2013a, p. 6; see
also Barbour, 1997 and Plantinga, 2011). On an ontological level, then, theism assumes that divine “present,
ongoing, and difference-making activity” (ibid) is real.
Methodologically, theism asserts that this divine activity can and should be included in a study of the world,
including a scientific study of the psychological world
(Reber, Slife, & Downs, 2012). In this sense, theism
stands in direct and clear contrast with the naturalistic
worldview, which, given the slippery slope already described, both denies and excludes God’s engagement
in the world. Psychology, as a naturalistic science,
then, is at risk of an implicit anti-theistic disciplinary prejudice, which could result in professional value
imposition, both within the discipline of psychology
and within psychotherapy and counseling specifically.
I will review the evidence of this value imposition in
psychology and psychotherapy below.

study religion and spirituality. Indeed, the flagship
APA journal whose primary focus is on such matters
(Psychology of Religion and Spirituality) explicitly prohibits the publication of any articles that take a theistic approach. The founding editor of the journal stated
in his introduction to the first edition of the journal
that “papers that aim to use theological constructs as
explanatory variables in psychological models are . . .
inappropriate” (Piedmont, 2008, p. 1). The succeeding
editor added her support, stating, “I feel strongly that
as a science, psychology should not and cannot admit
into its domain non-empirical approaches such as theistic psychology” (Park, 2017, p. 72). Aside from the
false claim that theistic approaches are non-empirical
(see Reber, Slife, and Downs, 2012), both editors cite
no justification for their exclusion. Given psychology’s
resolution discussed above, one can safely assume that
the editors would justify their exclusion of theism on
the grounds of methodological naturalism, though as
we have shown, a methodological exclusion of theism is not methodologically necessary or warranted
(ibid). More likely, given the slippery slope previously
discussed, these editors have implicit ontological commitments that lead them to arbitrate matters of faith
and theism, despite the APA (2007) resolution that
prohibits psychologists from doing so.
In any case, just over one hundred years after its
founding, psychology overwhelmingly excludes God’s
activity from its education, research, and publications.
Consequently, a student in an introductory psychology class might find a few references to religion in
their textbook, but they would likely find no mention
of God or God’s activity at all (Slife & Reber, 2009).
Students in research methods courses might find faith
and God’s activity cursorily mentioned in their textbooks, but usually only as an example of an alternative
epistemology to empirical science that is deemed inappropriate to psychological investigation despite the
absence of evidence or the presence of a justification
(Reber, 2018).

Psychology’s Exclusion of Theism

One of the obvious examples of the imposition of
the value of naturalism within the discipline of psychology is what Maier (2004) labels “God’s exile from
psychology” (p. 323). Maier has carefully examined
the history of American psychology and he identifies
a clear shift from its founding, in which psychology
was described by G. Stanley Hall in 1885 as “Christian to its root and center” (cited in Slife & Reber,
2009, p. 70), to becoming within almost a single generation, almost completely secularized. He attributes
this abrupt shift to a change in education. Maier finds
that while the chief founders of psychology, James
McCosh, G. Stanley Hall, and William James, among
others, were theists who saw education and training in
psychology as a necessary blend of theology and scientific courses, their students compartmentalized their
theistic beliefs, stopped taking theology courses, and
in true methodological naturalist fashion, banished
theism from the psychology classroom and laboratory
to the domain of the church.
This approach, in which God and God’s activity
are compartmentalized and exiled, remains a key feature of the discipline, even in fields of psychology that

Psychology’s Operationalization/
Transformation of Theism

Psychology’s exclusion of God and God’s activity
from psychological research, textbooks, and journals
limits any study of religious and spiritual phenomena
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and experiences to naturalistic constructs, variables,
and psychological models (Piedmont, 2008). The
result of this naturalistic restriction is that theistic religious and spiritual phenomena and experiences are
either excluded from psychological research or have to
be operationalized and transformed into naturalistic
phenomena and experiences, even when they center
on God and God’s activity (see Gantt & Williams,
2020; Slife & Reber, 2012; Reber, 2006).
Research on people’s image of God, for example,
cannot include an examination of participants’ experiences of God as a potential factor that could contribute to the development of their image of God
even when the explicit focus of the study is the participants’ “relationship to God” (Cassibba, et al., 2008,
p. 1755). This is not because those experiences cannot be gathered and examined just as readily as any
other experiences people have had and could describe
to a researcher, but only because the use of “theological constructs as explanatory variables in psychological models” (Piedmont, 2008, p. 1) has been deemed,
without reason or justification, to be “inappropriate”
(ibid; Park, 2017). The curious result of this restriction to only naturalistic variables and explanations is
that the researchers replace theists’ experiences of God
with naturalistic “proxy” variables, like frequency
of church attendance, prayer, and other measures of
“religiosity”. This is like trying to understand a person’s relationship with his or her marriage partner by
counting how many times he or she eats dinner together with his or her spouse each week instead of
asking the person about his or her experiences and
relationship with his or her spouse directly.
Reviews of the psychological research on religious
and spiritual experiences and phenomena, including
God image, relationship with God, and faith (Reber,
Slife, & Downs, 2012), and also miracles (Reber &
Slife, 2013a), conversion and forgiveness (Slife, Reber,
& Lefevor, 2012), and prayer and meditation (Slife &
Reber, 2012), shows that the operationalization and
transformation of these experiences and concepts into
naturalistic proxy variables is almost universal. So too
is the absence of a single theistic interpretation of the
findings on any of these topics, even though for theists, including the theistic participants in the studies,
these topics necessarily include an active, differencemaking God. Nevertheless, the transformation of

theistic factors and theistic interpretations into naturalistic factors and interpretations took place in every
study reviewed, even though theistic experiences,
constructs, and interpretations are as available and
are as empirically viable as naturalistic constructs and
interpretations (Reber & Slife, 2013b). Moreover, the
data gathered from a theistic approach to psychological research, as has been demonstrated in previous research (e.g., Reber, Slife, & Downs, 2012), are just as
capable of quantitative and qualitative analysis and
can produce tests of hypotheses, results, and theistic
interpretations that are interesting, informative, and
compelling, while also according with the experiences
and interpretations of the people studied. Thus, it is
not empiricism in general, or the scientific method
specifically, that compels these naturalistic operationalizations, transformations, and interpretations, but
rather the assumption of naturalism that pervades the
discipline as an implicit anti-theistic bias (Slife & Reber, 2013b).
Psychology’s Omission of Theism
from Theistic Theories

Given the pervasive exile of God and divine activity
from psychology and in light of what we might refer
to as the naturalization of theistic theories, experiences, concepts, and interpretations in psychological
research, it should come as no surprise that the importation of theistic theories into psychology results
in that theism being stripped away. If not surprising,
the omission is still glaring, especially when the theory’s author is explicitly theistic and theism is clearly
essential to their theory. Butera (2010), for example,
claims that even the theism of Saint Thomas Aquinas,
which is foundational to all of his thinking and is the
primary focus of his work, is not necessary to a psychology based on Aquinas’s ideas. Aquinas’s psychology, Butera asserts is “’philosophical,’ not ‘theological,’
even though Aquinas was first and last a theologian,
because the psychology he developed is able to stand
on its own, independent of his theological commitments (p. 348).
Aside from the indelible alteration of Aquinas’s
ideas that would ensue from the removal of the foundational assumption of theism from those ideas,
why does Butera deem it necessary for Aquinas’s
53
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psychology to stand on its own, independent of theological commitments? Do naturalistic theories need
to stand alone independent of their naturalistic commitments? No, only theistic theories need their theism removed as they are imported into psychology
so the theory can fit within the naturalistic worldview
that psychology embraces. But can the theory even be
ascribed to Aquinas after such a drastic omission?
The same questions arise with the importation of
Martin Buber’s theistic philosophy into humanistic psychology (Slife & Reber, 2009). Martin Buber
stated that:

that, “the self ’s relation to the Other, in Kierkegaard,
is mediated by God. Furthermore, God is the Thou
who addresses me and who gives me an identity and
vocation of which I am not the origin” (para. 1). Despite the many clear statements and even warnings
about the necessity of Kierkegaard’s theism to his
ideas, psychologists assert, without justification or explanation, that Kierkegaard’s theism can be left out,
even as his philosophy is used to develop theory and
conduct research. Rusak (2017) argues, for example,
that “one can accept Kierkegaard’s use of religious archetypes in crafting a psychical metaphysics, irrespective of whether one forthrightly believes in Christian
doctrine’s actuality or not” (para. 15). Lippitt (2016)
notes that psychology has largely secularized Kierkegaard’s work and even recalls a colleague stating that,
“Kierkegaard is a source of great insight provided ‘we
ignore the religious stuff ’” (p. 23).
The fact that these and other psychologists who use
Kierkegaard’s philosophy, but remove its theistic elements, acknowledge that they are doing so speaks to
their awareness that Kierkegaard was a theist and that
his work assumed theism. However, as with Butera
and Rogers, they provide no justification for their
omission, no evidence that leaving Kierkegaard’s theism in the theory would be a problem, and they in no
way account for the significant changes to the theory
that result from the removal of its theistic foundation
once it is imported into psychology. The justification,
it would seem, is implicitly provided by the professional value of naturalism, which requires that theism
be omitted, even without testing whether and to what
extent the theory is capable of having a positive impact
on psychological theory, research, and practice with its
central theism left in. Like exclusion and transformation, the omission of theism from theistic theories,
justified only by psychologist’s adoption of naturalism
rather than by critical, empirical, or any other form
of evaluation, is a form of disciplinary discrimination
against the theistic worldview.

If I myself should designate something as the ‘central
portion of my life work,’ then it could not be anything
individual, but only the one basic insight. . . that the IThou relation to God and the I-Thou relation to one’s
fellow man are at bottom related to each other” (cited
in Friedman, 1988, p. 429).

Carl Rogers, who drew from Martin Buber’s philosophy in his understanding of relationships in the
development of his person-centered psychology, left
Buber’s foundational theistic principle out of that psychology. As Friedman (1994), the world’s foremost expert on Buber’s thinking described it, “Rogers clearly
accepted Buber’s I-Thou relationship and made it his
own without plumbing the depth of the philosophical
anthropologies...that Buber judges to be its necessary
underpinnings” (p 46-65).
A similarly glaring omission of theism from an explicitly theistic philosophy can be found in the importation of Soren Kierkegaard’s existential philosophy
into existential psychology. Speaking of his life’s work,
Kierkegaard stated:
What I have wanted and want to achieve through
my work, what I also regard as the most important,
is first of all to make clear what is involved in being a
Christian, to present the picture of a Christian in all
its ideal, that is, true form, worked out to every true
limit, submitting myself even before any other to be
judged by this picture, whatever the judgement is . . . ”
(Kierkegaard, 1859/1998, p. 129).

Even a cursory reading of Kierkegaard’s works demonstrates clearly that for him being a Christian rests
upon a theistic foundation. This is confirmed by those
with expertise in Kierkegaard’s philosophy. Westphal
(2015), for example, notes that Kierkegaard’s theism
is unmistakable and is central to his work, stating

Psychotherapists’ Risk of Imposing
Naturalism on Clients

To what extent might psychotherapy and counseling, which in many ways can be understood as the
practice arm of psychological theorizing and research,
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be susceptible to these same forms of disciplinary
and institutional anti-theistic bias and discrimination? To examine this question, it may be helpful to
first acknowledge that in the case of counseling and
psychotherapy, there is an added level of complexity
at play. As mentioned in the introduction, therapists
and counselors must abide by their ethics codes and
are expected to receive regular training and education in the risks of imposing their values on clients.
Counselors and therapists have received a great deal of
training in the risks of imposing their personal values
on their clients, including personal religious values.
Perhaps, they have been trained using a vignette like
this one, which demonstrates potentially damaging
ways in which a therapist’s personal religious values
can be imposed on a client:

imposition, exile God and God’s activity from their
therapy offices? And, if they do keep their own and
their clients’ beliefs about religion and faith outside
the door, what are the implications of that exclusion
of God and God’s activity for clients of faith who often want their religious and spiritual beliefs and experiences to be part of therapy (Rose, Westefeld, &
Ansely, 2001). Holmberg, Jensen, and Vetere (2020)
addressed these questions in a mixed-method study of
family therapists and their clients. They found that the
clients in their sample overwhelmingly wanted there
to be “’room to speak’” (p. 7) about spiritual matters in
therapy. They wanted to be “‘met and acknowledged’
as a whole person, which included the spiritual and
religious dimension of life” (p. 8). And they “described
leaning on God in their crises, and felt that God could
be included in their therapy, both as a contributor and
as a relationship” (ibid).
Holmberg, Jensen, and Ulland (2017) note how
these same therapy clients, whose beliefs and experiences are inherent to their identity and their understanding of their psychological issues and struggles,
find a therapist’s unwillingness to include religion
and spirituality in their work frustrating and unproductive. A research participant named “Julia” demonstrates this frustration well, noting that when she
brought up what she describes as the “room” of her
spirituality to her therapist, he would not enter the
“room” and instead closed the door. The study authors
quote directly from the interview transcript to capture
Julia’s experience and frustration with the therapist’s
exclusion of her spiritual “room”.

A Christian therapist is working with an atheist client
who is suffering from a terminal illness. The therapist
is concerned about the client’s salvation and sees this
as a more important issue than their psychological
health at this point of therapy. They seek consultation
from a colleague who says, “At this point, you must
follow God’s will, not your ethics code.” The therapist
goes into the next session and shares about their faith,
encouraging the client to accept Jesus as their savior
(Hoffman, 2008, p. 23).

Having been well-trained to recognize such behavior as a clear violation of the ethics code and desiring
to avoid even the slightest hint of personal value imposition, it is possible that many therapists steer clear
of religion, spirituality, and faith altogether in working
with their clients (Hathaway, Scott, & Garver, 2004).
What they may not realize, however, is how their efforts to avoid the imposition of personal religious
values might inadvertently contribute to professional
value imposition, especially when training in the risks
of the professional value imposition of naturalism in
psychotherapy is rare. Consequently, therapists who
avoid spiritual and religious issues in an attempt to
steer clear of personal religious value imposition may
not appreciate the degree to which they might exclude
theism, naturalize theistic experiences and interpretations, and/or omit theism from theistic theories, in
their work with their clients.

Julia: The therapist did not understand. He said, ‘So
what?’, and for me it was very strange. I felt that he
couldn’t understand my Christian background, that
even such a cruel man [her husband] is hard to leave,
because it’s wrong in a way . . . And I felt, it was something about our connection, because this ‘room’ is so
big in my life, and with the therapist, I needed to close
the door. I could talk about everything else, there were
thousands of things, but I felt it wasn’t fruitful to continue.
Interviewer: And this ‘room’ is, as you say, quite big?
Julia: For me it is very big, yes, it infiltrates everything;
it infiltrates who I am as a person, and . . . I just felt that
a door was closed, yes; he did not understand me at all.
I felt I was a problem (p. 16).

Psychotherapists’ Risk of Excluding Theism

Is it possible that some counselors and psychotherapists, in an effort to avoid personal religious value
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The study authors conclude that, “the therapist
in this case was unable to enter the client’s spiritual
world; he really did not understand her frustrations”
(Holmberg, Jensen, & Ulland, 2017, p. 16). By excluding the client’s “room”, the therapist may believe
he or she successfully avoided imposing any religious
or spiritual values on the client. However, this is not
the case, because the therapist’s exclusion of God and
God’s activity is itself an imposition, one that is reinforced by the professional value of naturalism. By refusing to open the door to the room of Julia’s spiritual
world, a room that she states “infiltrates everything; it
infiltrates who I am as a person” (ibid), the therapist
imposed an exclusionary professional value on the client and the client discontinued therapy as a result.
Another research participant (“Betty”), laments that
after nearly three decades of working with multiple
therapists on her marriage that any attempt by her to
raise religious and spiritual issues in therapy were not
taken up by any of the therapists. She recalls one couple’s session in which she got up the courage to share
with the therapist that her and her husband’s:

It may be that Betty and Julia coincidentally encountered therapists who have the personal value that
matters of God and God’s activity are to be kept out
of therapy, but Holmberg, Jensen, & Vetere’s (2020)
interviews of the psychotherapists suggest a more professional values-based norm toward this practice of
exclusion:
It is of concern to us that some said if they talked
to clients about this topic they would keep this secret, as they were afraid to become unpopular in the
therapeutic establishment. One therapist said: ‘If you
want to stay within the most recognised therapeutic
environments, those who have the greatest authority,
my feeling is that they do not talk much about this’
(T1, 1, 40-42). Some therapists had tried talking with
other colleagues, but felt rejected and almost ignored.
. . In this study, therapists found it easier to raise and
respond to secular spirituality: values and meaning
not connected to religion. Both clients and therapists
found that religious perspectives were more marginalised (p. 12).
Psychotherapists’ Risk of
Transforming Theism

spiritual life was difficult. She said a few sentences
and then stopped. Her husband replied that he did
not agree, and trivialized her raising of the issue. The
therapist did not follow up, and the dialogue about the
topic ceased. The therapist did not raise the issue in
the succeeding sessions (Holmberg, Jensen, & Ulland,
2017, p. 16).

Along with exclusion as a potential professional
value imposition, might some counselors and therapists be at risk of imposing naturalism on their theistic clients by altering, re-framing, or explaining away
their clients’ theistic experiences, concepts, and understandings? One therapist’s account of an event in his
training as a clinical psychologist anecdotally suggests
this possibility:

In addition to feeling like her efforts to bring religion and spirituality into therapy went nowhere,
Betty expressed frustration that the therapists never
attempted to bring these things up in therapy themselves. She told her interviewer:

I still remember one of my supervisors laughing at a
video of me working with one of my clients. The client was a good Christian woman from Indiana who
honestly felt that her unhappiness stemmed from her
spiritual struggles. My supervisor was perfectly clear,
“Help her get out of that religious claptrap. Her sadness has nothing to do with God. It has solely to do
with her lack of reinforcements or pleasures in her life.”
Now, as a doctoral student who was anxious to please,
I’m ashamed to say, I carried my supervisor’s message
back to this Christian woman. In fact, I was so good
at selling this message that she eventually learned not
to think of her happiness in relation to God at all. She
learned to think of herself and her relationships as
though God had nothing to do with her emotions and

I believe it really is about time. I have been ready for
years. I think it is completely strange that questions
haven’t been raised before, not a single question for 27
years; what does your faith mean within this context?
(ibid).

In summarizing the outcome of Betty’s three decade
failure to have religion and spirituality included in
therapy, the authors state that, “the couple’s therapists
had never introduced the topic of their spiritual world
during the sessions and Betty felt she had become
resigned to the situation” (Holmberg, Jensen, & Ullande, 2017, p. 16).
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activity and even if the believer describes experiencing God’s involvement in the development of the beliefs. In this way, the therapist transforms the theists’
theism into naturalism. Once transformed, the basic
processes involved in theistic beliefs are understood
to be the same as the basic processes involved in all
other beliefs. As a result, as Maloney (1998) puts it
in his somewhat dated but still apropos description
of the psychological processes that underlie conversion, “the decision of a Muslim to become a Moonie
is no different than the decision to change from using
an electric typewriter to using a computer” (para. 5).
Each “conversion” involves a process of change in belief
system, but the nature of the belief systems involved is
not relevant.
Once theism is naturalized in this way, therapists
can work with religious and spiritual beliefs in the
same way they work with other beliefs in their treatment. In Religious Cognitive-Emotional Therapy
(RCET, Rajaei, 2010), for example, the therapist interprets the client’s theism in the same way the therapist
would understand any other beliefs, as being more or
less rational, supportive of health, or helpful in finding meaning. As a set of beliefs, RCET therapists can
apply the same techniques to the treatment of theistic
client’s beliefs as any other client’s beliefs to help them
change or reframe any irrational or unhealthy beliefs
into beliefs that promote mental health and wellbeing.
If a client tells their therapist that their emotional
struggles are a consequence of God punishing them
for past sins, the RCET therapist interprets that statement for the sake of treatment, not as a description of
the client’s relationship with God or as a description
of God’s activity in relation to the client’s righteousness, but as a problematic set of beliefs that need to be
changed. Change for the RCET practitioner is about
the valence of the belief, more so than the content.
Negative beliefs, regardless of what they are about,
need to be changed into positive beliefs, because a
positive view of the world promotes mental health
and wellbeing, as the RCET therapist understands it
(Rajaei, 2010). So, the therapist works with the theistic client to reframe and adjust their negative belief
about God and God’s punishment into a positive belief about God and God’s support. The excerpt below
outlines the process by which this is done:

the relevant events of her life. “After all”, I recall her saying, “What you’re saying Brent has to be right because
science has proven it.”
When my client and I were finished, she no longer saw
God as the source of her emotional healing. She no
longer considered even the possibility that her spiritual struggles could be intertwined with her emotional
struggles. At least for this part of her life, she was a
Christian atheist, a Christian in other aspects of her
life, but an atheist in her understanding of her emotions. I do think however, that if she had continued her
therapy with me and my supervisor, I would have persuaded her little by little, one problem after another, to
understand every part of her life as though God didn’t
matter (Slife, 2013).

This example of transformation is striking, but not
rare. On the contrary, many psychotherapy approaches
that seek to integrate religion and spirituality into
therapeutic work, operationalize and truncate clients’
and therapists’ theistic experiences and interpretations into psychological constructs and mechanisms
that will work within the profession’s naturalistic
worldview. Transformations and operationalizations
include: “virtues” (Peteet, 2013), “basic human values”
(Corey, n.d., p. 118), “religious content” (Abernethy
& Lancia, 1998), “the dynamic human spirit” (Helminiak, 2001), a dimension of personality (Piedmont
& Wilkins, 2013), an evolved meaning-making system (Paloutzian, 2017), and above all others, beliefs
(Khoynezhad, Rajaei, & Sarvarazemy, 2012).
By focusing on and working with naturalized constructs, like religious beliefs or values, therapists might
assume they are open to their clients’ theism. However, if religious beliefs or values are understood by the
therapist only naturalistically, for example, as mental
states that evolve to help people make and find meaning in their lives (Paloutzian & Mukai, 2017), then
the therapist is not open to the possibility that God
could be involved and actively participating in the formation of those beliefs. Paloutzian’s work on beliefs
confirms this (e.g., Paloutzian & Mukai, 2017; Seitz,
Paloutzian, & Angel, 2018). For Paloutzian and his
colleagues theists’ beliefs about God are “a mental activity generated by neural circuits in the brain” (Seitz,
Paloutzian, & Angel, 2017, p. 3).
On this account, clients’ religious beliefs are naturalistic even if the target of the beliefs is God or God’s
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Cognitive Therapy (CT). Believing that he can separate Aquinas’s psychology from Aquinas’s theology
without irrevocable consequence to that psychology in
the psychotherapy context, Butera seeks to provide all
CT practitioners with a secular theoretical foundation
that will guide their application of CT.
Similarly, existential psychotherapists who utilize
Kierkegaard’s theoretical concepts in their practice acknowledge Kierkegaard’s theism, but believe they can
separate that theism off from their therapy and secularize Kierkegaard’s religious and spiritual concepts in
developing and applying their therapeutic practices.
Spivak (2004), for example writes that:

The RCET therapist identifies the clients negative and
nihilistic beliefs about the world and existence and
helps them to change these beliefs into positive and
purposeful one’s, so that the clients acquire a new insight of existence. . . The therapist makes clients aware
of God’s role. (God is the best patron with best characteristics that guides human beings). When people accept God as the unique creator, they will gain the safe
and reliable force in the world and feel relief in their
lives (Rajaei, 2010, p. 84-85).

Even though theistic clients may desire and feel
“that God could be included in their therapy, both as a
contributor and as a relationship” (Holmberg, Jensen,
& Vetere, 2020, p. 8), the RCET therapist does not
have to include these participative, relational features
in their treatment. They could be added on for effect,
but they are not necessary (Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt,
2010). For the RCET therapist, all that is needed is a
reframing of their clients’ beliefs about God and God’s
role from one that is negative, irrational, and unhealthy
to one that is positive, rational, and promotes mental
health. The risk of value imposition involved, however, as we saw with the anecdote above (Slife, 2013),
is that these transformations of theism, as the client
experiences and understands it, into naturalism, as the
therapist understands it, might persuade clients that
God does not really matter. That is, an operationalization of theism into a set of beliefs might teach the client to understand their relationship to God and God’s
activity as only a matter of their personal beliefs, beliefs which they can choose and change, as they might
change from using a PC to a MAC computer. They
can do all of this with the help of the therapist, but apparently not with the help of an actively engaged God.

Kierkegaard’s writings range from the philosophical to
the deeply religious. I have drawn from both streams
of his thinking but have secularized his more religious
concepts. I believe that his writings so powerfully portray a genius’ incisive observations of human struggle,
that even when his religious intent is de-emphasized,
the concepts that are distilled can greatly empower the
process of psychotherapy and counseling (p. 2).

Wanting to be clear that he is not the first or only
therapist to omit Kierkegaard’s theism, Spivak goes
on to note that “the secularization and use of Kierkegaard’s works for psychotherapeutic theory and practice
is not unique. Many psychotherapists including Guntrup (1969), Binswanger (1944), and Loewald (1980)
utilized Kierkegaard’s writings to enhance their work”
(p. 3).
Finally, like Carl Rogers, psychotherapists who have
imported Martin Buber’s philosophy into psychotherapy (e.g., Scott, et al., 2009) have left Buber’s theism
out. Even, Maurice Friedman (2002a), the foremost
expert on Buber’s philosophy, developed a dialogical psychotherapy in which Buber’s central theistic
relationality has been altered so that only the I-Thou
relation between client and therapist is discussed:

Psychotherapists’ Risk of Omitting Theism
from Theistic Theories

Do we see any evidence that counselors and psychotherapists omit theism from theistic theories in
their therapeutic practice? I have already mentioned
Butera’s (2010) assertion that Aquinas’s psychology
can stand alone without attending to Aquinas’s theism, but I should note here that Butera’s ultimate
purpose for importing Aquinas’s psychology into the
discipline is to use it as a “theoretical framework” for
understanding and treating emotional disorders using

By ‘‘dialogical psychotherapy,’’ we mean a therapy that
is centered on the meeting between the therapist and
his or her client or among family members as the central healing mode. . . Only when it is recognized that
everything that takes place within therapy—free association, dreams, silence, pain, anguish—takes place
within the context of the vital relationship between
therapist and patient do we have what may properly be
called dialogical psychotherapy (p. 11-12).
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A significant problem in each of these cases, is that
theologians and philosophers who have studied these
thinkers’ work in great depth and detail, have noted
that the importation of these thinkers’ ideas into psychotherapy with their theism removed, is not possible,
or at least fundamentally alters the ideas and the practices that ensue from them. Philosophers Tietjen and
Evans (2011), for example, have shown that therapists
who wish to use Kierkegaard’s ideas cannot escape Kierkegaard’s theistic commitments: “If Kierkegaard offers contemporary therapists anything at all, it is quite
clear that it is not value-free or neutral. Mental health
is inextricably linked to spiritual health, and ultimately
a client’s relationship with Christ cannot be dismissed
as incidental to the healing process” (p. 282). Ventimiglia (2008) intimates the same concern with Buber’s
work, noting that “Buber’s religious beliefs are basic to
his system of dialogical psychotherapy. . . For Buber,
God is at the heart of every human encounter. He is
the “Eternal Thou” that is experienced in every genuine meeting between two people” (p. 612).
Most curiously, Friedman, asserts in his theological
and philosophical publications that the relationship
with God is central to Buber’s thinking, is the source
of transformation, and cannot be separated from our
relationships with each other, as this example illustrates:

psychology’s professional commitment to naturalism
and, as a result, leaves the theism that is central to Buber’s work completely out of his psychological publications. The odd consequence of that omission is an
education and training in a dialogical psychotherapy
that is based on Buber’s work, but leaves “the reality of
the meeting between God and Man which transforms
man’s being” (Friedman, 2002b, p. 87) out of the therapeutic process, a process which, for Buber, requires
God’s participation.
These omissions of theism from theistic theories
in the practice of psychotherapy does not allow theistic clients access to the transformative and healing
core of the theory. In all three of these cases, but especially in Kierkegaard and Buber’s work, these thinkers
dedicated their lives to understanding how a person’s
relationship with God is necessary to and can bring
about transformative and healing mental and spiritual
outcomes, including relief from depression, anxiety,
and social isolation. To deprive a client of faith access
to these theistic insights and relational engagements
because the therapist knowingly or unknowingly endorses the professional value of naturalism risks an
unethical imposition that could stand in the way of
improved health and wellbeing.
Training in Theism

The fundamental beliefs of Buber’s I-Thou philosophy are the reality of the I-Thou relation into which
no deception can penetrate, the reality of the meeting
between God and man which transforms man’s being, and the reality of the turning which puts a limit
to man’s movement away from God (Friedman, 2002b,
p. 87).

If, as these illustrations discussed above suggest,
there is at least the risk of imposing the professional
value of naturalism on clients in psychotherapy and
counseling, and if that imposition might result in the
exclusion, transformation, or omission of theism in
the practice of psychotherapy and counseling, then as
the code of ethics asserts, ethical counselors will seek
training in this area of risk. This would seem to be especially important given that anywhere from 53% to
77% of clients want to discuss religious and spiritual
issues with their therapist and 72% of clients would
prefer to work with a therapist who respects and integrates the client’s faith into the therapy work (Pearce,
2015). Unfortunately, even among psychotherapists
and counselors who do want to be more inclusive of
their client’s faiths in their work, many do not feel sufficiently trained (Vogel, et al., 2013) and competent to
do so (Hathaway, Scott, & Garver, 2004). In light of
these feelings and given the high risk of professional

However, in his psychological publications where he
reviews his dialogical psychotherapy based on Buber’s
work, he makes no mention of our relationship to
God and its transformative impact on our being at all:
Buber’s ‘I-Thou’ philosophy is concerned with the
difference between mere existence and authentic existence, between being barely human and being more
fully human, between remaining fragmented and
bringing the conflicting parts of oneself into an active
unity, between partial and fuller relationships with
others (Friedman, 2002a, p. 9).

It would seem that Friedman, perhaps with the guidance of journal editors and peer reviewers, is aware of
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value imposition just reviewed, regular and meaningful training in theism is critically needed and should
be actively pursued by psychotherapists and counselors. This paper introduces some of the key features of
theism as an initial educational step toward the development of a more comprehensive training program in
this area of significant need.

matter of his theorizing, but as his direct experience
of God’s difference-making participation in his writing. Kierkegaard states that God not only provided
the help and assistance he needed to write each day,
but that God also “directed things behind the scenes,
when K was not yet conscious of the full meaning
of his written words” (Moser & McCreary, 2010,
p. 128) and “had curbed me in every respect” (Kierkegaard, 1859/1998, p. 87). As a result of God’s ongoing
participation in the writing process, Kierkegaard can
state with confidence that God “finds favor” (p. 24)
in the works produced and that “it is truly pleasing to
God that the truth is served in this way” (p. 60).
Just as our three exemplar theistic philosophers differ in their ideas and experiences of God’s activity in
the world, therapists should expect differences among
their clients (as well as differences among theistic
therapists). Furthermore, they should be prepared for
their clients to have a less explicit and less well-defined
articulation of their theistic position than theologians
and philosophers who have dedicated much of their
lives to thinking about these things. Nevertheless,
theistic clients will bring to therapy experiences and
ideas about God’s activity in the world that matter
to the way they live and understand their lives, and it
behooves the ethical therapist, who is sensitive to the
risk of imposing their personal and professional values and perspectives on their clients, to engage clients
in a discussion, first about whether they are theists
and second, to what degree they view God as actively
involved in their lives. In order to do this effectively,
ethical therapists will seek to gain an understanding
of the common forms of theism and will benefit from
learning to identify where these forms fall on the continuum of God’s activity in the world (fig. 1). They will
also examine their own position on these matters and
share that position with the client as they discuss how
therapy might proceed.
Before examining the common forms of theism, it
is important to define the poles of the theism continuum. The terms used to designate these poles, “weak”
and “strong” theism do not speak to God’s strength
or to the strength of a person’s faith. They also do
not designate a moral position, as if one pole is good
and the other bad. They simply designate the conceptualized level of God’s activity or involvement in
the world. If God is experienced and assumed to be

The Theism Continuum

Theism, like naturalism (Dixon, 2008) or any other
worldview is not a monolith. Theists can differ widely
on their assumptions and experiences concerning
the nature of God’s activity in the world. One theist
might experience and understand God as directly and
personally involved in every aspect of their life, while
another might describe God’s activity in their life as
limited to rare miracles. Theistic theologians and philosophers differ in their experience and understanding
of God’s involvement in the world as well, including
the three exemplar philosophers discussed previously
in this article. Aquinas, for example, views God as directly inaccessible and unknowable. For Aquinas, it is
only through the via negativa or negative way (i.e., by
knowing what God is not), that we gain an indirect
sense of what God is. As such, Aquinas:
distances from our world all discussion of real divine
relation by stating quite baldly, ‘there is no real relation
in God to the creature’. Creatures, that is, may experience a real relationship of dependence on and need of
God, but God experiences no such relationship to his
creatures (Mackey, 1983, p. 182).

Buber’s theism, by contrast, is direct, personal, and
relational. In his words, God:
enters into a direct relation with us men in creative,
revealing, and redeeming acts, and thus makes it possible for us to enter into a direct relation with him.
This ground and meaning of our existence constitutes
a mutuality, arising again and again, such as can subsist
only between persons” (Buber, 1958, p. 135).

Kierkegaard (1846/1992), like Buber, embraces
a relational theism in which God is personal and
directly involved in our lives, such that “the Godrelationship of the individual human being is the
main point” (p. 77). It is “what makes a human being
a human being” (p. 244). However, Kierkegaard not
only writes about God’s involvement in our lives as a
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Figure 1. The theism continuum.
made with an individual (Helaman 10:5-10) or group
of people (D&C 82:10).
The poles of the theism continuum could as easily
be labeled “limited” and “unlimited” as they are weak
and strong, but given the predominate use of weak
and strong theism in the literature, this article will use
those more common terms as well. The figure above
indicates where on the theism continuum, with weak
theism on the left and strong theism on the right, the
most common forms of theism fall. Five of these common forms of theism fall on the left half of the continuum and as such can be regarded as representing
varying levels of weak theism. The other five fall on
the right half of the spectrum and can be understood
as representing varying levels of strong theism. Each
of the five weak forms of theism, ranging from the
weakest of the weak to the strongest of the weak, will
be reviewed first, followed by the forms of strong theism, ranging from the strongest of the strong to the
weakest of the strong.

involved in everything that happens in the
world at all times and in all spaces, then the theism is
strong. If God is assumed to be only involved in certain, rare times and places, then the theism is weak.
One way to understand the distinction between
weak and strong forms of theism is in terms of limitations. In weak theism some form of a priori spatial
and/or temporal limits on God’s activity are assumed
to be necessary (Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt, 2010).
These limits are often put in place to reconcile theism
with naturalism. A number of 18th century scientists,
for example, limited God’s activity in the workings of
nature to the creation period or to occasional miraculous moments of intervention, like the parting of the
Red Sea. Aside from these unusual times of direct involvement and intervention, these scientists asserted
that natural causes and processes operate without
interruption or alteration by a divine source (Dixon,
2008).
Strong theistic approaches, on the other hand,
would require that no a priori spatial, temporal, or
any other form of limitation is placed on God’s activity. As Slife, Stevenson, and Wendt (2010) describe
it, for a strong theist “God’s activity would be seen
as potentially unlimited at any given time and at any
given place, including the here and now of the psychotherapy session” (p. 166). The only restriction on
that potentiality would be any self-limitations that
God would choose, not some set of necessary a priori
restrictions. God may choose, for example, to limit or
“bind” himself through specific promises or covenants

Weak Theism

Deism and Dualism. These two forms of theism are
located on the far-left side of the continuum because
both place major limitations on God’s activity. Deism
is the idea that at the time of creation God was directly,
intentionally, and actively engaged in the world, but
once the creation period was complete God stepped
away from the universe to allow it to run according to
natural laws autonomously (i.e., without divine intervention). The quote below captures the essence of this
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form of theism and illustrates the implications of this
significant temporal limitation on God’s activity:

ontological naturalist, the supernatural realm is a fiction and is not a real world. For the methodological
naturalist, it could be real, but it cannot be studied or
understood using the scientific method, nor does it
have any necessary bearing on the operations of the
natural world. In this sense, dualism results in the
same outcome as deism, which is that God and God’s
activity are not part of the world we currently live
(Slife & Reber, 2009).
Although Deism mostly came and went as a form
of religion during the Enlightenment, remnants of
this weak form of theism continue to inform the way
many theists see the world. Dualism, on the other
hand, which has been around since the time of the
pre-Socratics, is very much alive and well today, both
within naturalistic science and scientific psychology, as
well as among the laity and some theologians. Given
its compatibility with naturalism, many therapists of
faith also likely embrace some form of deistic and/or
dualistic theism.
In light of its ubiquity, therapists should expect to
encounter clients who, when asked about God and
God’s activity in the world, would say that they believe
God exists and they believe we are created by God. At
the same time, they also believe that God created us
with our minds and our capacity for reason and empirical science so we would manage and make sense
of this life and work out our psychological issues on
our own. In such cases, therapy with theistic clients
of a deistic or dualistic type would likely proceed with
little change from the therapeutic approach used with
non-theists or atheists, except that the client’s religion
and spirituality might be included as a source of some
of the client’s beliefs. These beliefs, like any other beliefs, could be examined in terms of their irrationality
and negativity and could be treated using principles
and techniques like those described by RCET or
other CBT approaches to therapy. It is likely that a
client who endorses a deistic and/or dualistic form of
theism would have little if any concerns with therapy
of this type and would probably support it.
Sacred Places and Sacred Times. Continuing with
temporal and spatial limitations on God and God’s
activity, there are forms of weak theism that allow for
God’s involvement in this world, but only at times and
in locations that are unique for their holiness. As such,
these forms of theism are found somewhat closer to

According to deism, we can know by the natural light
of reason that the universe is created and governed by a
supreme intelligence; however, although this supreme
being has a plan for creation from the beginning, the
being does not interfere with creation; the deist typically rejects miracles and reliance on special revelation
as a source of religious doctrine and belief, in favor of
the natural light of reason. Thus, a deist typically rejects the divinity of Christ, as repugnant to reason; the
deist typically demotes the figure of Jesus from agent
of miraculous redemption to extraordinary moral
teacher. Deism is the form of religion fitted to the new
discoveries in natural science, according to which the
cosmos displays an intricate machine-like order; the
deists suppose that the supposition of God is necessary as the source or author of this order (Bristow,
2017, section 2.3, para. 4).

The common simile for deism is God as the perfect watchmaker, who set all things in order, wound
the watch up, and then let the watch run its intended
course without any additional tinkering.
Dualism, like Deism, separates God and God’s activity from the world we live in, but does so spatially. For
the dualist there are two worlds or realms, the realm
in which God dwells, which is divine and metaphysical, colloquially referred to as heaven, and the realm in
which we dwell, the earth, which is human and physical (Dixon, 2008). Given their unique natures (e.g.,
God and heaven’s perfection vs. Human and Earthly
imperfection) these two worlds cannot and do not directly interact or affect each other. They run alongside
or parallel to each other. For theologians who embrace
dualism this means that Jesus Christ was not and
could not be “literally divine” (McCabe, 1985, p. 471)
and that “God did not literally suffer in Jesus” when
he was nailed to the cross. Instead, God “surveys the
suffering of Jesus and the rest of mankind” from his
wholly transcendent heavenly purview and perhaps
knows “a kind of mental anguish at the follies and sins
of creatures“ (ibid).
The ontological and metaphysical forms of naturalism described in the first part of this article are both
dualistic in that they separate the natural world and
its processes, events, and causes, from what they describe as the supernatural world. Of course, for the
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the center of the theism continuum. For sacred space
theists, there are specific places that are endowed with
a special sacredness that allows for God’s involvement
in our lives at that place. Within the Jewish faith tradition, Mount Sinai, the tabernacle which housed the
ark of the covenant, and eventually the Holy of Holies
within Solomon’s temple, were places of a uniquely
hallowed designation where a prophet could receive
revelation from God in a way that might not be possible otherwise. In Christianity, the incarnation of God
in Jesus Christ, who was in Bethlehem, Nazareth, Jerusalem, Gethsemane, and Golgotha made these locations sacred places where God walked among men and
taught them, healed them, and redeemed them. And,
for Muslim theists, Mecca, where Muhammad was
born and the Dome of the Rock covering the place
where Muhammad’s ascent to heaven began are holy
places where God’s presence is manifested.
Many theists take pilgrimages to these holy sites
seeking revelation, guidance, and purification from
divinity that cannot be achieved in everyday places.
Eliade (1980) illuminates the theistic conception and
experience of sacred space:

be time periods that bring heaven closer to earth than
would otherwise be possible. Eliade (1987) speaks
of the way in which festivals commemorating sacred
events can “reactualize” that sacredness and God’s activity in it. Sacred time, he writes:
Is the time that was created and sanctified by the gods
at the period of their gesta, of which the festival is precisely a reactualization. In other words the participants
in the festival meet in it the first appearance of sacred
time, as it appeared ab origine, in illo tempore. . . By
creating the various realities that today constitute the
world, the gods also founded sacred time, for the time
contemporary with a creation was necessarily sanctified by the presence and activity of the gods (p. 69-70).

Therapy clients who endorse a sacred space/sacred
time theism differ from deistic and dualistic theists
in that for them God is involved in our world in a
difference-making way, albeit only in those places and
times that are sacred and holy. All other places and
times are profane, meaning they operate as they always
do, following natural laws and processes regardless of
God’s existence and activity. For these theists, religion
and spirituality, then, constitutes more than a set of
beliefs or the workings of the rational mind that God
has given human beings in our creation. Religion and
spirituality include experiences that have occurred in
holy places and within sacred times in which God was
present and participatory in a meaningful way. It may
also mean that they see their path to health and wellbeing as one that needs to include visits or even pilgrimages to sacred places and participation in sacred
events and festivals where the client can commune
with God and receive guidance, comfort, and support.
Therapists working with clients of this stripe would
want and need to be prepared to appreciate, encourage, and integrate visits to sacred sites, like churches,
temples, and synagogues, as well as participation in
sacred holy days, rituals, and festivals into their work
with clients alongside their more naturalistic techniques and practices in order to treat the whole person in a way that does not discriminate against their
clients’ sacred place and sacred time theism.
“God of the Gaps”. Somewhat closer to the center
of the continuum, God of the Gaps theism emerged
initially as an Enlightenment theology that tried to
explain phenomena that scientists could not account

Within the sacred precincts the profane world is transcended. On the most archaic levels of culture this
possibility of transcendence is expressed by various
images of an opening; here, in the sacred enclosure,
communication with the gods is made possible; hence
there must be a door to the world above, by which the
gods can descend to earth and man can symbolically
ascend to heaven. We shall soon see that this was the
case in many religions; properly speaking, the temple
constitutes an opening in the upward direction and ensures communication with the world of the gods. Every sacred space implies a hierophany, an irruption of
the sacred that results in detaching a territory from the
surrounding cosmic milieu and making it qualitatively
different (p. 25-26).

Sacred times are also viewed and experienced by
many theists as unique periods in which God is active
in the world. Passover, Ramadan, and both the coming
of Christ and the anticipated second coming of Christ
are sacred times for many theists for they signify
events in which God’s presence and activity was and
is made manifest on earth. Similarly, the holy days and
festivals that honor these sacred events, like Christmas and Hanukkah, are thought by many theists to
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for within their Deistic conception of the world.
Plantinga (1997) outlines the precepts of this original
conception:

Contemporary God of the Gaps theists, then, are
very comfortable relying upon science for explanations of many of the phenomena and events that take
place in the world. They trust in medicine, technology, and scientific research for many, if not most aspects of their lives. As such, theistic clients of this type
would be comfortable with science-based therapeutic practices and treatments for much of their therapy.
At the same time, they have experienced God’s involvement in their lives in areas where science may
be lacking or does not apply, areas like miracles, personal revelation, material blessings that come to the
obedient and faithful (e.g., from paying tithing), and
so on. In a therapeutic context, clients who embrace
this form of theism might want to work with a therapist who is open to talking about these events and
experiences and is willing to do so in terms of a God
who is involved in certain aspects of the clients’ lives.
They may also desire or even expect that in addition
to using therapeutic techniques and practices that
have received scientific support and are helpful for
many aspects of their treatment, the therapist would
be open to and might even involve the activity of God
in understanding and treating features of the clients’
disorders and issues where scientific explanation and
treatment fall short.

Natural science investigates and lays out the structure
of this cosmic machine, in particular by trying to discover and lay bare [natural] laws, and to explain the
phenomena in terms of them. There seem to be some
phenomena, however, that resist a naturalistic explanation — so far, at any rate. We should therefore postulate a deity in terms of whose actions we can explain
these things that current science cannot. Newton’s suggestion that God periodically adjusts the orbits of the
planets is often cited as just such an example of Godof-the-gaps theology. The following, therefore, are the
essential points of God-of-the-gaps theology. First,
the world is a vast machine that is almost entirely selfsufficient; divine activity in nature is limited to those
phenomena for which there is no scientific, i.e., mechanical and naturalistic explanation. Second, the
existence of God is a kind of large-scale hypothesis
postulated to explain what cannot be explained otherwise, i.e., naturalistically. Third, there is the apologetic
emphasis: the best or one of the best reasons for believing that there is such a person as God is the fact that
there are phenomena that natural science cannot (so
far) explain naturalistically (para. 2).

Though both strong theists, like Plantinga, and
many naturalists have refuted God of the Gaps as a
coherent and persuasive theology, some contemporary
theists do invoke God’s activity to explain personal
life events and experiences that science cannot or has
not yet explained. For example, when medical professionals and the scientific instruments and tests they
employ fail to explain how a loved one seemingly miraculously healed from a life-threatening injury or disease following faithful prayers or blessings given on
their behalf, family and friends will often reference
God’s intervention. When a person hears an audible
voice instruct them to turn down one street instead
of another and they find out that a horrible car accident occurred on the street not taken, science cannot
explain the voice and its direction to the driver, but
the activity of God does explain the protective voice
for the theist. Given that for a number of these theists
there are more than a few Gaps that God fills and
God does so on somewhat regular occasion, this form
of theism falls closer to the center of the theism continuum.

Strong Theism

A defining feature of weak theism is that the limitations placed on God and God’s activity in the world
stem from naturalism and science. In the case of strong
theism, there are either no limitations placed on God
at all or the limitations are self-imposed by God, but
no limitations come from the natural world or scientists’ study of it. Two forms of strong theism that place
no limitations on God and God’s activity will first be
reviewed followed by a description of two forms of
strong theism in which God’s activity is self-limited.
Supernaturalism. Located on the extreme right
side of the continuum, supernaturalism represents the
theological position that there are no natural or consistent causes. Instead, God directly causes everything
that exists and happens in every moment and does
so solely according to His will. This form of theism,
which is sometimes associated with pantheism and
extreme forms of theistic determinism, has ancient
origins across many early religions and cultures. It was
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directly challenged by proponents of the philosophy
of naturalism, which emerged primarily at the time
of the Renaissance and became fully realized in the
Scientific Revolution. Naturalists’ chief concern with
supernaturalism is that “because in every occurrence
only divine will matters, [supernaturalism] precludes
any human understanding of cosmic functioning”
(Helminiak, 2013, p. 44). Nothing can be explained,
even the consistent and replicable speed at which a ball
rolls down an incline plane, beyond “God wills it so”.
This form of theism is widely refuted by naturalists and theologians alike, largely because it restricts
our understanding of the world and compromises
free-will, yet threads of it can be found among some
theists who attribute everything that happens in the
world and to them personally to God’s will. Therapists who encounter clients who embrace this form of
theism will find that they give all credit to God for
who they are, what they have experienced, and what
they will become. Also, since God is the agent of their
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, then any change in
their psychology, including change resulting from the
therapist’s practices and techniques, will come from
God and will only occur if God happens to will it. In
this sense, the therapist too is caused by God, as is
the theorist who developed the therapeutic approach
initially, as is the effectiveness of the techniques associated with the approach. God’s hand is actively and
directly bringing about the efficacy of all these things.
Occasionalism. Just to the left of supernaturalism
on the theism continuum is occasionalism. Occasionalism, like supernaturalism, holds the position that
there are no natural laws and God is the direct cause
of all things. However, God has made a covenant to
maintain regularities and order in nature by intervening at every point in time. As Plantinga (2001) describes it, “God is already and always intimately acting
in nature which depends from moment to moment . . .
upon divine activity” (Plantinga, 2001, p. 350). Consequently, Plantinga (2016) argues, every time I have
the will to raise my arm, God takes the occasion of
my willing it to raise it, for only God can cause such a
thing to happen:

event; for example, there is a more or less constant correlation between my willing to raise my arm and my
arm’s rising. That is because God ordinarily takes my
willing to raise my arm as the occasion for causing my
arm to rise (p. 136).

This “more or less constant correlation” that God allows and facilitates makes possible regularities in the
world that make explanation and prediction possible
and still allows for human agency (though Plantinga
himself is unclear on how our will is not also caused
by God). Occasionalists then, like Supernaturalists,
give all credit to God for all that is and all that they do
and become, but they also appreciate God’s promise
to act consistently and constantly, for the most part in
predictable and understandable ways. Theistic clients
of this type would be less likely to describe God as
capricious than the supernaturalist and would demonstrate less of a superstitious theism. The therapy
process, from the occasionalist perspective, consists
of a series of more or less constantly correlated human willing/ God acting events that are all brought
to fruition by God. As such, God is fully present and
intimately involved in every aspect of therapy and its
outcomes, for good or ill, just as God is active in all
mental disorders and issues, and in every occasion for
health and wellbeing. Occasionalism, then, is a thoroughgoing theism in which God acts consistently and
constantly in the lives of clients and therapists and in
their work together.
Concurrence. The forms of theism that are right of
center on the theism continuum all involve a level of
God’s self-limitation that is not found in occasionalism and supernaturalism. In concurrence theism, for
example, God is the primary cause of all things, but he
allows human beings to be secondary causes (i.e., to
make decisions; Vicens, n.d.). Sproul (n.d.) describes
concurrence through the example of Job:
In essence, concurrence says that two or more parties
can act in the same event and produce a given outcome
without all parties having the same intent. Job’s life is
a good illustration of concurrence. Satan intended to
discredit Job, and by extension, to discredit God. The
intent of the Chaldeans and Sabeans was to enrich
themselves. Our Lord’s intent was to vindicate Job’s
faith. Each of these players was necessarily involved in
Job’s suffering, but at different levels and with different
motivations (para. 3).

The only causal power is divine causal power. God
causes every change that occurs. God is the only real
cause. Sometimes, however, there is a correlation between certain events and God’s causing some other
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Concurrent theism is a popular form of theism today as it supports many theists’ belief in and experience of moral agency and accountability, but it also
acknowledges a very involved and purposeful God
who wants human beings to grow and learn from their
choices and mistakes while still guiding us toward the
outcomes He has designed for us. Therapists who
encounter concurrent theists as clients and have a
conversation with them about God and God’s activity in therapy will likely find that they give God ultimate credit for their lives and their circumstances. At
the same time, they also genuinely believe that their
choices and the choices of others matter and have contributed to who they are and to the issues and concerns
that have led them to seek therapy—all for the greater
good of realizing God’s will. Not unlike the example
of Job above, the concurrent theistic client would see
such things as parental neglect or even abuse in their
childhood as bad choices made by parents that nevertheless work within God’s plan for the client. The
client, like Job, will desire to make choices about
how to interpret, live with, and heal from that history
in ways that align with God’s will, and a therapist who
understands that desire can be helpful in that process,
for the therapist too makes choices about treatment
that, from the client’s perspective are ultimately concurrent with the activity of God, whether the therapist intends that concurrence or not.
Process Theism and Open Theism. These two
forms of theism both embrace the idea that God selflimits, each to varying degrees, for the sake of having a
full and meaningful relationship with his children. In
process theism:

surprised by us, and we can choose to go against
God’s will. As Rissler (n.d.) describes it:
Because God loves us and desires that we freely choose
to reciprocate His love, He has made His knowledge
of, and plans for, the future conditional upon our actions. Though omniscient, God does not know what
we will freely do in the future. Though omnipotent, He
has chosen to invite us to freely collaborate with Him
in governing and developing His creation, thereby also
allowing us the freedom to thwart His hopes for us.
(para. 1)

The distinguishing feature of both of these forms of
theism is human self-determination, which God allows for and makes genuine by limiting his determination and to some extent his foreknowledge. Therapy
clients who embrace these forms of theism experience
their relationship with God as mutual and open to the
possibility that the human side can persuade the God
side of the relationship in some ways. They see God
as involved in every aspect of their lives, but not in a
determinative way, as much as in an open, responsive,
and collaborative way. These clients may not only want
to discuss this open and responsive relationship with
their therapist, but they would likely also want the
therapist to participate in this relationship, collaborating with the client and with God as active participants
working together in the treatment process.
Including Theism in Psychotherapy

This review of the various forms of theism located
along the theism continuum is not intended to be exhaustive. Nor does it suggest that theists find themselves located once and for all on a given point on
the continuum. As with other aspects of human being, theism is contextual and fluid and can shift and
change, especially in times of crisis and suffering,
which are often the times in which people seek out
therapy. In light of this, the theism continuum should
be considered a guide or signpost to help therapists
prepare for and navigate their initial and ongoing discussions with theistic clients. It also offers therapists
of faith some points for reflection on their own theism
and the opportunity to think carefully and critically
about how they generally relate theism to naturalism
within their therapeutic approach and how they might
need to adjust their typical approach when working

it is an essential attribute of God to be fully involved
in and affected by temporal processes. This idea contrasts neatly with traditional forms of theism that hold
God to be or at least conceived as being, in all respects
non-temporal (eternal), unchanging (immutable,) and
unaffected by the world (impassible). Process theism
does not deny that God is in some respects eternal, immutable, and impassible, but it contradicts the classical
view by insisting that God is in some respects temporal,
mutable, and passible (Viney, 2018, para. 1).

Open theism increases the level of God’s selflimitation to such a degree that there is genuine
give and take with God, God allows himself to be
66

Naturalism, Theism, and Value Imposition

Reber

Figure 2. The theism continuum and psychotherapy.
with clients who embrace a form of theism that differs
from their own.
To encourage that careful and critical reflection
a brief overview of some of the challenges that accompany the common ways in which counselors and
psychotherapists might include theism in therapy is
provided. As figure 2 indicates, some of these inclusions of theism in therapy are weak in that they assume an add-on God who is limited by natural laws
and processes and is therefore not a necessary factor
in the therapy treatment. Other forms of inclusion
of theism in therapy are strong because an altering
God is assumed to be necessary to the treatment and
unlimited in his activity in the therapy.

even talk of their own theism and acknowledge
that God’s activity is an important part of mental
health and wellbeing. Then, when they engage in the
practice of their therapy and treat the client’s presenting concerns, they will take off their theism hat
and put on their naturalism hat, because when it
comes to therapeutic efficacy, “God’s influence
is unnecessary to the mechanism of client change”
(Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt, 2010, p. 170). Of course,
“God Talk” can be added-on to help the client “relax
and relate” (ibid), but as Lovinger (1996) describes
it, “psychotherapy with religious clients is not essentially different from nonreligious clients” (p. 353).
Compartmentalized theism does include God in
psychotherapy to some degree and would encourage
sensitivity and respect for the client’s theism in some
ways, but it does not include theism in the psychotherapy process itself. This may not be an issue for
some theistic clients, who may share a compartmentalized sense of their theism with the therapist, but
for theistic clients who embrace a stronger theism,
compartmentalized theism would be at odds with
their understanding and experience of God and God’s
activity.

Compartmental Theism

Therapists who embrace a weak form of theism
(e.g., dualism) may be prone to compartmentalizing
theism. Slife, Stevenson, and Wendt (2010) describe
this approach:
These therapists may consider themselves to be strong
theists personally, perhaps disclosing their religious
affiliation and/or theistic beliefs in order to attract
or build rapport with theistic clients. However, their
professional theories and explanations do not reflect
strong theism as a core philosophy, and, in fact, are
often identical to secular and naturalistic approaches
(p. 170).

Peripheral Theism

Many therapists see the value of religious practices and activities, such as prayer and forgiveness, in
promoting mental health and wellbeing, and some
therapists practice these activities themselves. Despite
their theistic origins and depending on the therapist’s

Some clinicians refer to the compartmentalization
of their theism from their psychotherapy in terms of
wearing “two hats” (Landau, 2017). They will wear
their theism hat to learn about their client’s faith and
speak in their same religious language. They may
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compartmentalization tendencies, these practices and
activities can be:

Inconsistent theism is closer to strong theism than
compartmentalized and peripheral theism, but limitations are still placed on God and God’s activity, and
they are usually put in place by the therapist for naturalistic reasons.
Inconsistent theistic therapists might include theistic interventions and practices in areas that appear
more obviously spiritual to them (e.g., seeking forgiveness), but exclude theistic interventions and practices
from areas that they perceive to be more naturalistic (e.g., drug therapy). Such an approach would be
incompatible with strong forms of theism that place
no limitations on God’s activity and are embraced by
many theistic clients. As a result, psychotherapists approaching theism inconsistently might intentionally
or unintentionally teach their clients that “the spiritual
portion of therapy, in which God’s activity is clearly
needed, could be viewed as an ‘add-on’ to the naturalistic theories and methods that are presumably seen as
neutral to God’s activity” (Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt,
2010, p. 172).

conceptualized either as requiring an active God or
as working through more conventional psychological
mechanisms, and thus not requiring an active God. In
peripheral theism, therapy strategies may include and
even focus on these peripheral aspects, but their relation to or need of an active God is not part of their
understanding or significance (Slife, Stevenson, &
Wendt, 2010, p. 170).

In peripheral theism, then, the therapist includes
theistic practices and activities in the therapy process,
but ignores or separates off the theistic components
of the practice that for theists are necessary. Consequently, rather than forgiveness requiring God’s grace
to soften the heart of a wounded or offended person,
forgiveness is understood only as “a sequential process
of ceased resentment followed by understanding, empathy, and altruism” (Krejci, 2004, p. 96). God’s activity is moved to the periphery and as such becomes
unnecessary to the implementation and efficacy of the
practice in the psychotherapy process. The therapist
can add on theistic language and reference God’s grace
and other activities in the application of the practice,
but only because the client desires it, not because
God’s activity is necessary for change. Thus, as Liccione (2017) states with regard to the use of forgiveness in therapy as a peripheral aspect of theism, “one of
its advantages is that it can be applied with or without
a theological context.” (Liccione, 2017, para. 8). Not so
for the strongly theistic client who experiences God’s
grace moving through them as a necessary condition
for forgiveness.

Thoroughgoing Theism

For counselors and psychotherapists who assume a
thoroughgoing theism, “God is seen to be already present in the world and is potentially involved at all times
and in all places” (Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt, 2010,
p. 168), including the therapy office. This could mean
that God is seen as the sufficient cause of everything
that happens in therapy, as in supernaturalism and
occasionalism. Or, rather, God is a necessary condition for what happens in therapy, along with other
psychological and contextual conditions, including
the client and the therapist’s free-will, as in open and
process theism. In any case, “God’s activity is conceptualized to be the center of therapeutic change” (ibid).
This negates the possibility of compartmentalization
or inconsistent theism and means “prayer and other
peripheral aspects have a unique meaning from their
relation to a God who is already present and functionally active” (p. 167). For the thoroughgoing theistic
therapist, “God’s necessary activity is clearly reflected
at all levels of theory, method, and practice” (ibid).
Strongly theistic clients would find the inclusion
of God’s involvement in every aspect of therapy supportive of their thoroughgoing theistic worldview and

Inconsistent Theism

Some therapists may believe that some aspects of
therapy require and relate to an active God, while
other aspects do not. Slife, Stevenson, and Wendt
(2010) describe inconsistent theism as:
an attempt to combine—within the context of therapy—the incompatible assumptions of naturalism and
theism, resulting in a dualistic form of weak theism
where God’s activity is limited to a certain realm or set
of factors. The theistic components of therapy are thus
inconsistent with the naturalistic components (p. 171).
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would work very well with therapists who also embrace this form of theism. Clients who embrace weak
forms of theism, on the other hand, would not share
the thoroughgoing theistic therapist’s perspective that
“God’s influence is conceptualized ‘all the way down’”
(Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt, 2010, p. 168) and would
likely prefer some form of compartmentalization
of theism in the therapy process. As with the other
risks of a mismatch between the therapist’s conceptualization of theism and that of the client’s, it will
be essential for therapists to have initial and ongoing
conversations about their clients’ position on theism
and naturalism and to carefully and critically examine
any potential risks of their personal and professional
values, including in this case strong theistic values, being imposed on the theistic clients they treat.

Being members of the same church does not obviate the risk of value imposition in the area of theism.
It could, given potential presumptions of similarity by therapists actually encourage value imposition,
including the professional value of naturalism. Thus, it
is especially important that therapists who are members of the church receive training in theism, carefully
and critically evaluate their own theistic position, and
engage their clients, including especially clients who
are members of the church, in initial and ongoing dialog about their theism so they can provide therapy in
a sensitive, respectful, and ethical manner.
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